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Abstract
A wider release of police datasets could enable social scientists, community activists,
and civil libertarians to more effectively challenge discriminatory policing practices.
However, the privacy implications of such sharing must be carefully considered. It is
known that “de-identifying” data is not sufficient to protect the privacy of individuals.
New York City’s stop-and-frisk data is an example of one such police dataset.
The stop-and-frisk data contains information (including demographic information)
about all people stopped by the program from 2003 to 2012. This paper examines
the identifiability of this data. It examines the uniqueness of the data to investigate
the privacy implications of its release for the individuals targeted by stop-and-frisk.
It also suggests ways to re-identify this data.
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Widespread data-sharing enables researchers, community planners and activists to
make informed decisions about topics of interest to their communities. However,
datasets about individuals can reveal private and personally identifiable information.
To prevent unnecessary privacy breaches, data holders often omit or redact infor-
mation that is seen to be uniquely identifying, like name, social security number,
and address. Yet de-identifying data in this way is not sufficient to protect privacy:
research has shown that 87% of individuals can be uniquely identified by their gen-
der, date of birth, and zip code [24]. Such attributes, referred to in the literature as
“quasi-identifiers,” are not directly identifying by themselves, but can be combined
with outside, personally identifying information (like voter records) to re-identify
people. This paper will examine the potential for unintentionally privacy breaches in
New York City’s stop-and-frisk dataset.
1.1 Stop-and-Frisk Background
New York City’s stop-and-frisk program was drafted in 2001, following the 1999 mur-
der of unarmed African immigrant Amadou Diallo, who was shot forty-one times by
four white police officers. The 2001 legislation required police officers in New York
City to report detailed information about the hundreds of thousands of pedestri-
ans that they stop, question, and frisk every year, including information about the
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victims’ race [19]. The data was first released in 2007, as a result of legal action
by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), and it showed a large growth in
stop-and-frisk stops from the period of 2002 to 2006 [19].
Community activists and civil liberties groups have viewed the growth of the
program with contempt, arguing that stop-and-frisk disproportionately targets poor
Black and Latino New Yorkers [18]. The data played an important role in challenging
the program, since it showed that stop-and-frisk disproportionately targeted People
of Color and was ineffective at achieving its stated aim of reducing the number of
guns on the streets [18]. For instance, the NYCLU report [19] showed that:
1. Young Black and Latino men make up just 4.7% of the city’s population, yet
they make up 41% of all stops.
2. 90% of young Black and Latino men stopped were innocent (not issued a sum-
mons or arrested).
3. Black and Latino New Yorkers were more likely to be frisked, but less likely to
have a weapon than frisked whites.
4. Guns were recovered in only one-sixth of one percent of all the stops.
Consequently, the program is being phased out (at least in name) following court
rulings and mayor Bill de Blasio was elected in part due to his opposition to the
program [21].
1.2 The Stop-and-Frisk Dataset
The stop-and-frisk data contains 101 different categories of information, including
fields specific to the individual being stopped: date of birth, race, sex, height, build,
eye color, and hair color [29] [8]. It is possible that combining such fields with outside
information (like social media profiles, voter records, criminal databases, or personal
knowledge of an individual fitting the description) might be sufficient to uniquely
identify individuals in the dataset. This presents researchers and activists with a
11
double bind situation: the data release enabled researchers and community groups
to challenge the harm caused by the stop-and-frisk program, yet such data could
be abused to cause additional harm the individuals in the dataset. For instance,
it is possible that a nosy neighbor or employer who knows that someone has been
stopped by police, along with general physical characteristics of their target, could
cross reference this information against the stop-and-frisk data to see exactly why
their neighbor or potential employee was singled out for police harassment and would
learn what occurred during the stop. This private information could then be used
discriminate against them in some way. It is therefore necessary to examine the risks
and benefits of such data disclosure.
We cannot predict what future datasets will be released, and such datasets could
make it easier to compromise the privacy of people in this dataset. However, any such
privacy breach would require that individual’s data be unique in the stop-and-frisk
dataset, since this would allow an adversary to cross reference the stop-and-frisk data
with an additional data source to definitively re-identify the individual stopped: if
more than one individual shares the same characteristics, an adversary would not be
able to link a name to a particular stop with certainty. To examine the potential
for harm posed by the stop-and-frisk data, this thesis examines both: the extent to
which the personal attributes contained in the dataset are uniquely identifying; and
ways to re-identify this data.
In all parts, this paper focuses on the data released for the year 2012 by the NY-
CLU [29], though data from 2003 to 2012 released by the New York Police Department
(NYPD) [8] is occasionally examined as well. This is motivated by the fact that we
are studying the uniqueness of the data in order to get at individuals’ representation
in the data, and we consider factors like height and weight which are likely to change
dramatically over longer periods of time. This is particularly important considering
that 49.9% of all stops over all years are of people aged 14-24, whose height and
weight are likely to fluctuate more than those of older people [19]. Additionally, 2012
is the most recent year that the NYPD reported over half a million stop-and-frisk
stops (there were 532,911), down from a peak of 685,724 in 2011 [19]. Due to political
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pressure and challenges to the program, the number of stops decreased dramatically
to 191,851 in 2013 [19]. Additionally, the 2013 data does not contain dates of birth,
which is a major factor in the uniqueness of the data and, consequently, the privacy
risks associated with its release. Finally, the 2012 data is sanitized by the NYCLU
in a way that preserved the maximum amount of information from the raw data:
incomplete and improperly coded records were fully reconstructed, without deleting
any entries. For example, in some years of the NYPD dataset all the stops from
Staten Island are improperly coded and no stops from this borough appear in the
data. Additionally, in some years of the NYPD data, the number of stops involving
individuals of unknown sex meets or exceeds the number of stops involving women,
whereas in the NYCLU data all stops are coded as either male or female.
1.2.1 Stop-And-Frisk Data Characteristics
It is necessary to understand the basic characteristics of the NYCLU data, since it
will inform the experiments that follow. Of the 532,911 stops in 2012, the majority
involved men: men were stopped 487,065 times, accounting for 91.4% of the individ-
uals stopped, as seen in Table 1.1. Women were stopped 38,062 and are 7.1% of all
stops. Additionally, the majority of stops involved African Americans: African Amer-
icans were stopped 284,229 times (53.3% of all stops), white Hispanics were stopped
129,368 times (24.3%), whites were stopped 50,366 times (9.5%), Black Hispanics
were stopped 35,772 times (6.7%), Asian and Pacific Islanders were stopped 17,058
times (3.2%), and American Indians and Native Alaskans were stopped 2,257 times
(0.4%) (Table 1.2). The race of people stopped was similar for each gender, except
that white women were more likely to be stopped when compared to all women than
white men compared to all men (Table 1.3).
Gender of All Stops
Men 91.4%
Women 7.1%
Table 1.1: Percent of stops by gender.
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American Indian/Native Alaskan 0.4%
Table 1.2: Percent of stops by race.
Race by Gender of Stops Men Women
African American 54.9% 53.3%
White Hispanic 25.0% 24.0%
White 9.4% 13.7%
Black Hispanic 7.0% 5.4%
Asian/Pacific Islander 3.3% 3.2%
American Indian/Native Alaskan 0.4% 0.3%
Table 1.3: For each gender stopped, percent of stops by race.
Additionally, 34.4% of all stops occurred in Brooklyn, 20.8% in Queens, 20.7% in
Manhattan, 19.2% in the Bronx, and 3.9% in Staten Island (Table 1.4). The most
common recorded height was 68 inches (13.7%), and the most common weight was 160
pounds (13.0%). 40.2% of all stops had no date of birth recorded, which is significant
for this paper’s later uniqueness and re-identification studies.






Table 1.4: Percent of stops in each of the five boroughs of New York.
In addition to information about the individuals stopped, the data contains a
number of fields related to the stop-and-frisk incident. For instance, a summons or
arrest was issued in only 11.1% of all stops, meaning 88.9% stopped were innocent,
according to the NYCLU’s definition [19]. Furthermore, only 11.1% of stops were
due to a suspicion of violent crime. At least one act of force by police was used in
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17.3% of all stops (which includes an officer using their hands, putting the suspect
on the ground or against a wall, drawing their weapon, pointing their weapon, using
their baton, using handcuffs, pepper spray, or other acts of force). Finally, guns were
recovered in only 714 stops, or 0.01% of the total stops made in 2012.
1.2.2 Sensitive Information in the Stop-and-Frisk Dataset
To get a sense of the amount of information that an attacker could gain from re-
identifying the stop-and-frisk dataset, it is useful to consider the content and amount
of the information coded in each stop. In addition to the demographic information,
the 101 fields of the dataset include information about why stops were made and
what occurred during the stop. Linking this data back to an individual may harm
their reputation or livelihood, even if they were completely innocent of any crime (as
88.9% of people in the data were). While any information could potentially constitute
sensitive information (for instance, knowing where and when someone was stopped
might be sensitive if that person did not want their location to be known), we consider
the following fields to be particularly sensitive, since they tend to cast the individual
in a distinctly unfavorable light:
1. The crime code describing the crime involved.
2. The offense for which the individual was arrested.
3. The offense for which a summons was issued.
4. The crime that the individual was suspected of.
5. The reason the officer used force against the individual in the data.
6. That the individual was frisked.
7. That the individual was searched.
8. That an arrest was made.
9. That a summons was issued.
15
10. That contraband was found.
11. That a weapon was found on the suspect, including: a pistol, rifle, assault
weapon, knife or cutting instrument, machine gun, assault weapon, or other
weapon.
12. That the officer used force against the suspect in the following ways: using his
hands, placing the suspect on the ground, placing the suspect against the wall,
drawing a weapon, pointing a weapon, using a baton, using handcuffs, using
pepper spray, or using other force.
13. The reason for the stop, including: carrying a suspicious object, fitting a relevant
description, casing a victim or location, acting as a lookout, wearing clothes
commonly used in a crime, actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive
movements, actions of engaging in a violent crime, or a suspicious bulge.
14. The reasons for a frisk, including: violent crime suspected, other suspicion of
weapons, inappropriate attire for season, actions of engaging in a violent crime,
refusal to comply with the officer’s directions, verbal threats by the individual,
knowledge of the individual’s prior criminal behavior, furtive movements, having
a suspicious bulge, having a hard object, having the outline of a weapon, or an
admission by the individual.
15. The basis for a search, including: having a hard object, having the outline of a
weapon, or the admission by the individual.
16. Any additional circumstances, including: proximity to the scene of an offense,
evasive response to questioning, associating with known criminals, changing di-
rection at the sight of an officer, being in an area with a high crime incidence,
being seen at a time of day that fits a crime incidence, sights or sounds of crimi-
nal activity, a report by a victim, witness, or officer, or an ongoing investigation.
These sensitive attributes are used to assess how much sensitive information is
contained in each stop. The results are presented in Figure 1.1, which reports the
16
average number of sensitive attributes per stop, with error bars to indicate the vari-
ance.
1.3 Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses related work in
the field of data privacy, including other work done with the Stop-and-Frisk dataset
as well as foundational work on data linkage attacks and data privacy. Chapter 3
discusses the methods used for assessing the data’s uniqueness. The stop-and-frisk
dataset is rich with information, so deciding which information to use to examine
the uniqueness and re-identification potential of the dataset is an open question that
this paper explores. Likewise, the dataset is different from those explored by previous
authors in that an individual might be stopped multiple times, and Chapter 3 presents
the methods used to account for this. Chapter 4 then presents the results of these
uniqueness studies. Chapter 5 goes on to discuss some methods for re-identifying the
dataset, as well as the results of these methods. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the
paper with a discussion of the findings.
17
Figure 1.1: Average number of sensitive attributes per stop, 2012
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter provides an overview of previous research and work related to this paper.
Specifically, it examines earlier work on de- and re-identification of datasets, the
development of data privacy techniques, and other studies involving New York’s stop-
and-frisk data.
2.1 De-Identification, Re-Identification
Previous research has shown that de-identifying data by removing names and other
characteristically identifying attributes, like social security numbers and addresses,
is not enough to protect the privacy of individuals in datasets. The term “quasi-
identifier” was introduced by Tore Dalenius in 1986 [5] to refer to pieces of partially
identifying information, which themselves are not uniquely identifying, but can be
combined with other outside information to uniquely identify an individual. Quasi-
identifiers have since been used to re-identify a number of different datasets, showing
that the practice of scrubbing only traditionally identifying attributes from datasets
is insufficient to protect the privacy of the individuals in the data.
In 1997, Latanya Sweeney showed that it was possible to re-identify de-identified
hospital records of state employees released by The Massachusetts Group Insurance
Commission by linking them with publicly available information. She demonstrated
this by locating then-governor William Weld’s records, who had been admitted to
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the hospital after a much publicized collapse at a college commencement ceremony,
and presented them to him [25] [2]. Similarly, in 2013 Sweeney showed that some
de-identified hospital records could be linked to newspaper stories [27]. Additionally,
in 2013 Sweeney, Abu, and Winn re-identified individuals in the Personal Genome
Project by linking their publicly available profile information to voter lists, as well
as mining the documents for names [28]. Moreover, in 2008 Narayan & Shmatikov
showed that it was possible to re-identify data released by Netflix as part of a com-
petition by linking it to reviews on the movie review site IMDB [17].
Other researchers have also exposed the insecurity of deidentified data. The work
of de Montjoye et al. [7] found that “mobility traces are highly unique,” since the
vast majority people in a dataset can be uniquely identified by four spatiotemporal
points. This paper replicates some of the methods of de Montyoye’s paper, while also
adding new methods to examine the uniqueness of subpopulations in the data.
On the other hand, Solomon et al. find that merely identifying unique combina-
tions of attributes does not necessarily pose a re-identification threat [23]. This paper
examined a large, sparse social science dataset and found individuals are similar to
their nearest neighbors in the dataset, which mitigates the risk of re-identification
through unique attributes. Solomon et al. use a cosine similarity test to measure
the difference between individuals in the dataset, which is similar to the test used by
Narayan & Shmatikov in their attack on the Netflix data [17]. This paper borrows
methods from this paper to explore how “uniquifiable” the stop-and-frisk data is.
In previous work, this author, Mir and Schlenker examined data from tollgates
in the center of Milan and conducted tests to examine the uniqueness of tollgate
usage [14]. We also conducted an inference attack identifying 8.5% of vehicles in
December based on their November traces [14]. The first part of this paper uses
similar methodology to this process. Additionally, since we do not have a “ground
truth” on which to build an inference attack, this paper attempts to individually
re-identify a small number of people based on the data.
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2.2 History of Data Privacy Techniques
Foundational work in the area of data privacy has proposed countermeasures to
protect the privacy of individuals in data releases. In 2002, Sweeney proposed “k-
anonymity” [26], which is a method for redacting and generalizing data. The aim of
Sweeney’s “k-anonymity” procedure is to ensure that no record is unique, and that
each record’s personally identifying attributes (which Sweeney considers to be things
like zip code, gender, or race) resemble at least k − 1 other records in the dataset.
In 2007, Machanavajjhala et al. revealed that k-anonymity provides insufficient
protection when the sensitive attributes of a data lack diversity: for instance, if every
person with the same zip code, gender and race in the data has the same medical
condition, say heart disease, then it’s possible to figure out that your target has heart
disease [12]. Likewise, Machanavajjhala et al. show that k-anonymity fails when an
adversary has background knowledge: for instance, if the adversary knows their target
is female and every other matching record in the database has prostate cancer as the
sensitive attribute, then the adversary can figure out what condition their target has
through a process of elimination. To address these limitations, the paper proposes
l-diversity, which ensures that the sensitive attributes, like a medical condition, are
also diverse.
Li et al. found weaknesses in l-diversity, however, and proposed t-closeness in
its stead [11]. Specifically, the paper criticised l-diversity as difficult to achieve and
argued that if the distribution of sensitive attributes is skewed or sensitive attributes
are similar to each other, l-diversity is insufficient to protect privacy. For example,
if 99 out of 100 people sharing a zip code, race and gender with a target have heart
disease, it’s very likely that the target does too. Additionally, if all the sensitive
conditions for those people who match the target are related to the stomach (the
paper cites gastric ulcers and gastritis), then an adversary will learn that their target
has an illness related to this part of the body. t-closeness aims to ensure that all
sensitive attributes are evenly distributed and dissimilar for all people sharing the
same personal information (like gender, age, race).
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In contrast to this “alphabet soup” of ad hoc proposals for data privacy, Cynthia
Dwork proposed mathematically rigorous definition of data privacy, called differential
privacy [10]. Unlike previous works, differential privacy does not attempt to distin-
guish between background information and the sensitive attribute and does not de-
pend on the content of the data. Instead, differentially private techniques ensure that
the results of data analysis are about the same with or without any one individual’s
participation. In doing so, they protect unusual individuals against a knowledgeable
adversary, who might have an unlimited amount of outside information about a par-
ticipant. To achieve this, differential privacy techniques add a small amount of noise
to the data. The trade off then is between utility and privacy in the dataset.
Differential privacy has been applied to many different fields and types of data
[15]. In 2013, Mir et al. constructed a differentially private model of human mobility
based on Call Detail Records [16]. Similarly, this author, Mir, Lu and Sanchez created
a differentially private, synthetic model of the data that preserved two of its key char-
acteristics with little error [13]. Future work could involve generating differentially
private, synthetic models of the stop-and-frisk data.
2.3 Re-Identifying the Stop-and-Frisk Data
Previous research provides techniques useful for de-anonymizing the stop-and-frisk
data. Luis Daniel created a quasi-identifier based on the reported date of birth,
gender, race and exact height of the individuals stopped, along with the precinct
in which each stop occurred [6]. Yet this approach may be flawed: we know from
the NYCLU’s report that the most frequently stopped demographic are Latino and
African American men of age 14-24 (41%)[19], yet Daniel’s approach led to a median
age of 24.7 for people stopped more than 5 times [6]. Daniel notes that his quasi-
identifier will tend to under count young people (who make up the bulk of the stops)
because his quasi-identifier only identifies people as being the same person if their
height is consistent. However, the height of teenagers is likely to increase over time.
Similarly, the inclusion of precinct in the quasi-identifier is misleading: precinct refers
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to the precinct where the stop was made, not the precinct where the victim lived.
Daniel’s method finds that the top five precincts where people are stopped more than
five times are all relatively remote to the city center (where most stops occur). It
is possible that this is because these locations might have less easy access to public
transportation and their residents may be less mobile. Accordingly, the method misses
victims who were stopped multiple times in multiple precincts. Finally, the author
assumes that this quasi-identifier can lead to easy re-identification. This is based on
a finding made by Latanya Sweeney, who showed that “87 percent of all Americans
could be uniquely identified using only three bits of information: ZIP code, birthdate,
and sex” [1, 24]. Yet this is far from clear for a number of reasons: we do not have
the victim’s zip code, the victims tend to be homogeneous in terms of race, sex, and
age, and Sweeney’s findings rely on voter records which may be less useful in poor,
minority communities where people are more likely to be disenfranchised. This paper
will examine Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier throughout, and compare it with other
possible quasi-identifiers.
A team of Harvard students also considered ways to re-identify the stop-and-frisk
data [30]. They proposed a quasi-identifier based on sex, race, date of birth, height,
eye color, hair color, and build. Yet it is possible that this quasi-identifier is overly
specific, since information such as hair color and build may not be consistently coded
throughout the data, and thus might under-count the number of stops per individu-
als in the data. This paper examines this quasi-identifier as well. The Harvard team
also proposes a method for re-identifying the 100 most frequently stopped individu-
als using New York State voter records, which this paper examines. They recognize
the limitations of this approach: the young, urban, African American and Latino
men disproportionately targeted by the stop-and-frisk program may be underrepre-
sented in the voter records. Likewise, they recognize that individuals’ most frequently
stopped location may not necessarily correspond to their home zip code. Neverthe-
less, the data does not contain information about the victims’ home location, so it is
necessary to approximate it through other means in order to apply the results from
Sweeney [24]. Finally, they suggest that arrest records or mug shots might be used
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to re-identify individuals who were arrested. This is explored in Chapter 5 in the




In order to examine the risks of re-identification posed by the stop-and-frisk dataset,
this paper considers the uniqueness of the stop-and-frisk data. As explained in Chap-
ter 2, to re-attach names to de-identified records in a dataset the records must be
unique in some way. For example, if an adversary knew that a 75 year old Native
American woman was stopped and frisked, and knew nothing else about her or the
stop, in order to determine with certainty when and why the police had stopped her
and what the outcome of the stop was, there would need to be only one such woman
in the dataset. If there were two such records, the adversary would learn about the
conditions of the stop with a varying degree of certainty: if both stops had the same
exact conditions, then the adversary would know for certain why the woman was
stopped, but if they diverged then the adversary would have narrowed it down to two
possible sets of conditions.
For all parts of these uniqueness tests, records that are missing any of the traits
under consideration are excluded. This is significant in the case of date of birth,
which is missing in 40.2% of all stops (it is coded as 12/31/1900 in the data).
Additionally, in all parts of the uniqueness tests, this paper examines the number
of matches for nine different groups:
1. All people
2. People aged 25 and older
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3. Women
4. Asian and Pacific Islanders (abbreviated as “Asian” throughout this paper)
5. Black people
6. Black Hispanics
7. American Indians and Native Alaskans (shortened to ”Native Americans”)
8. White people
9. White Hispanics
These constraints were selected in order to examine the threat posed to outliers,
like women and older individuals, as well as to highlight the different threats posed to
individuals of different races. The racial categories correspond to those found in the
NYCLU and original NYPD data. This paper explores the hypothesis that people
who are not young Black and Latino men would be more likely to be unique in the
data, and thus have a higher risk of re-identification.
3.1 Challenges
The data presented some challenges not found in other studies, such as that of de
Montjoye et al. [7] and [14]. First, while we would like to examine the uniqueness of
an individual in the dataset, each record in the data corresponds to a specific stop
rather than an individual. Thus, if an individual is stopped multiple times, they
will have multiple records associated with them. The data itself does not contain
a ground truth for identifying which records correspond to the same individual. To
compensate for this, we examine different combinations of demographic traits and
hypothesize that definitions with more specific combinations will do a better job
of singling out an individual without including other individuals. Additionally, we
attempt to address this issue by reporting the average number of matches for each
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quasi-identifier, in addition to the percent of stops involving a unique quasi-identifier.
This is intended to capture the fact that individuals may be stopped multiple times.
On the other hand, we recognize that there may be errors in the adversary’s
knowledge of their target as well as in the reporting or encoding of the data. For
example, an adversary may know only a subset of their target’s attributes, or may
only have a rough idea of their target’s height or weight. Likewise, police may guess
the target’s height or weight, or the target may misreport it. Additionally, as was
mentioned in the discussion of the dataset, youth are disproportionately targeted by
this program, and their height, weight, and build is likely to change over time. So,
whereas we prefer more specific quasi-identifier combinations in order to single out
individuals, there is a limit to how specific such combinations can be: if we make
the quasi-identifier too specific it may count a large number of individuals more than
once.
Similarly, some attributes are more likely to be accurately coded than others.
Whereas, for the most part, it might be easy to determine someone’s sex reliably
and consistently, their build (“heavy,” “muscular,” “medium,” or “thin”) might be
inconsistently coded depending on who is doing the coding and the shape the person
happens to be in at the time of the stop. Likewise, some hair and eye colors (like
“brown” and “black”) may be easily confused. Height and weight, as previously
mentioned, are also likely to change over time and may not be coded accurately if,
say, the police officer guesses, the person stopped refuses to participate, or the person
stopped does not know their exact height or weight. Race too may present some
challenges, since it is not always possible to accurately classify an individual by their
appearance and an individual may fail to self-report their race or report it in a way
that does not align with the available categories. Finally, without photo identification
or the participation of the person stopped, it might be hard to reliably determine their
exact date of birth. In the 2012 NYCLU data, it seems that most unknown birthdays
are coded as 12/31/1900 (40.2% of all stops), yet the two most frequent birthdays are
1/1/1992 and 1/1/1990, with 156 and 153 stops, respectively. This is slightly higher
than the 149 stops for the third most frequent birthday, 9/16/1995. While the fact
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that these two most frequent birthdays both occur on the first of the year suggests
that some stops may have just used these dates as convenient placeholders, it is not
clear how to separate these placeholder dates from real data.
To account for the possibility of error in the data, this paper also examines those
stops where the individual presented photo identification (though this population does
differ slightly from the population as a whole, see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). In the
state of New York, drivers licenses and non-driver identification cards include gender,
height, eye color, and date of birth fields [22, 4]. While other types of identification
exist, such as permanent resident cards and passports, we assume that these two would
be the most frequent forms of identification presented. Under this assumption, we pay
special attention to the uniqueness properties of individuals stopped who presented
photo identification using gender, height, eye color, height, date of birth, and race as a
quasi-identifier. This does assume that police officers are filling at the form according
to the identification they’re presented with, and also that an individual’s race would
recorded consistently.
3.2 Quasi-Identifiers
To account for these challenges, this paper examines up to 28 different combinations
of traits, representing different levels of outside knowledge and accuracy in the coding
and reporting of the data. It also reports on those stops where the person stopped
presented photo identification.
The trait combinations analyzed are enumerated below. Numbers 1 and 2 corre-
spond to the quasi-identifiers proposed by Harvard [30] and Luis Daniel [6], respec-
tively. 3-9 examine quasi-identifiers that correspond to what is found on New York
identification (sex, date of birth, exact height, eye color), as well as race, which we as-
sume could be determined consistently for most individuals, and weight with various
tolerances to account for errors in judgement, reporting, or natural fluctuations over
time. 10-15 examine sex, race, date of birth, height and weight, with varying levels of
tolerance on both height and weight. These were considered because, for those stops
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that do not involve photo identification, it seems possible that eye color may not be
coded consistently. 16-20 examine sex, race, date of birth, and height (with different
levels of tolerance), whereas 21-27 examine sex, race, date of birth, and weight (also
with different levels of tolerance) to account for cases where height or weight may be
missing, coded incorrectly, or unknown by an adversary. Finally, 28 examines only
sex, race, and date of birth under the assumption that these three characteristics are
perhaps the least subject to change, error or uncertainty: in most cases, sex and race
can be determined by an individual’s appearance, and date of birth, as previously
mentioned, is typically coded as 12/31/1900 if it is unknown.
1. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, hair color, build (as in [30])
2. Precinct, sex, race, date of birth, exact height (as in [6])
3. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, exact weight
4. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, weight +/- 10 pounds
5. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, weight +/- 20 pounds
6. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, weight +/- 30 pounds
7. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, weight +/- 40 pounds
8. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color, weight +/- 50 pounds
9. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, eye color
10. Sex, race, date of birth, exact height, exact weight
11. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 1 inches, weight +/- 10 pounds
12. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 2 inches, weight +/- 20 pounds
13. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 3 inches, weight +/- 30 pounds
14. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 4 inches, weight +/- 40 pounds
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15. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 5 inches, weight +/- 50 pounds
16. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 1 inch
17. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 2 inches
18. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 3 inches
19. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 4 inches
20. Sex, race, date of birth, height +/- 5 inches
21. Sex, race, date of birth, exact weight
22. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 10 pounds
23. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 20 pounds
24. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 30 pounds
25. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 30 pounds
26. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 40 pounds
27. Sex, race, date of birth, weight +/- 50 pounds
28. Sex, race, date of birth
Additionally, under the assumption that photo identification would allow an ac-
curate, consistent recording of the subject’s height, we omit those quasi-identifiers
that involve a tolerance on height for those studies involving stops with photo iden-
tification. Finally, an exact height is added to the quasi-identifiers that examine sex,
race, date of birth and weight for studies involving only those stops where photo
identification was presented.
To examine the uniqueness of the data, this paper uses three methods: sam-
pling, binning, and “uniquification,” which are described below. With sampling and
binning, we obtain information about how unique stops in the dataset are using the
quasi-identifiers listed above for a sample of the data (sampling) and the entire dataset
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(binning). With uniquification, we examine how uniquely identifying any number of
attributes are, without regard to the quasi-identifier categories previously mentioned.
3.3 Sampling
The sampling procedure begins by selecting an initial record at random that contains
all of the traits under consideration (for example, sex, race and date of birth). It
then searches all the data and keeps track of the number of matches for the trait
combination. A set of 1,000 different initial records are selected in this way, and
the average number of matches is reported along with the variance. Additionally, we
examine the percentage of these 1,000 selected initial records that had only one match
(themselves) and report this as the “percent unique.” Algorithm 1 shows how the
number of matches for each of the sampled 1,000 records is determined. It returns
a list with the number of matches, from which the average number of matches as
well as the percent unique (where there is only one match, the chosen target) are
determined. This is similar to the methods used in [7] and [14].
3.3.1 Sampling Example
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the sampling algorithm on a small, simplified
version of the dataset that contains only sex, race and date of birth fields. It assumes
the quasi-identifier combination under consideration is sex, race and date of birth.
3.4 Binning
Like the sampling algorithm, the binning algorithm calculates the average number
of matches and the percent unique, with a subtle difference: the sampled algorithm
reflects the average number of quasi-identifier matches and percent unique for each
individual stop, whereas the binning algorithm shows the average number of matches
and percent unique for each quasi-identifier “bin.” The binning uniqueness algorithm
is also more computationally efficient, making it possible to run on all individuals in
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Algorithm 1 Sampled Uniqueness Algorithm
1: procedure Uniqueness(data, quasiIDList)
2: numMatchResultList← []
3: i← 0
4: while i < 1000 do . Sample 1,000 people
5: target← Random.choice(data)
6: if isMissingQuasiID(target,quasiIDList) then . If the
randomly chosen target is missing any of the quasi-identifier fields, pick another




10: for all other in data do
11: isMatch← True
12: for all quasiID in quasiIDList do
13: if target.quasiID 6= other.quasiID then . If any
attribute differs between the selected target and the other, set isMatch to false




17: if isMatch then









(a) Select an initial record at random (M, Black, 9/3/1994) and compare it against
the first record in the dataset for all fields under consideration (here sex, race, date
of birth). This one does not match because the date of birth fields do not match.
(b) Continue by comparing the selected record in the same way against every other
record in the dataset.
(c) Eventually there will be at least one match for all the quasi-identifier fields
under consideration when the randomly selected record matches itself. This is
recorded as a match.
Figure 3.1: First three figures of the sampling algorithm example using sex, race and
date of birth as the quasi-identifier.
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(a) The selected record also matches another in the dataset for all considered
quasi-identifier fields (here sex, race and date of birth), so the count of matches is
incremented.
(b) When the randomly selected record has been compared against all others,
record the number of records that matched all of the considered quasi-identifier
fields (sex, race and date of birth in this case). In this example, the number of
recorded matches is 2.
Figure 3.2: Continued sampling example.
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the data. The procedure for determining the number of matches per quasi-identifier
bin is presented in Algorithm 2, which returns a list from which the average number
of matches per bin, the variance in this average number, and the percent of bins
holding only one individual (“percent unique”) are obtained.
Algorithm 2 Binning Uniqueness Algorithm
1: procedure Uniqueness(data, quasiIDList)
2: qidDict← dict()
3: for all stop in data do
4: if isMissingQuasiID(stop, quasiIDList) then . If the stop is




7: quasiIDString ← “,′′ .join(quasiIDList)
8: if quasiIDString in qidDict then
9: qidDict[quasiIDString]← qidDict[quasiIDString] + 1
10: else






Figure 3.3 illustrates the binning algorithm on a small, simplified version of the dataset
that contains only sex, race and date of birth fields. It assumes the quasi-identifier
combination under consideration is sex, race and date of birth.
3.5 Uniquification
Finally, this paper examines the percent of stops that can be made unique, or “uniqui-
fied” by any one, two or three combinations of attributes. This is similar to the work
presented by Solomon et al. [23], and “uniquify” as a verb comes from this work.
Rather than using all 101 attributes, this paper limited the attributes to the follow-
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(a) Select the first record in the dataset and enter the quasi-identifier fields under
consideration (M, Black, 2/4/1990) as a key in a hash table, setting the value to
1.
(b) Continue in the same way for every other record in the dataset. Whenever a
new quasi-identifier instance is encountered (here F, Black, 3/9/1994), add a new
key to the hash table.
(c) When a record is encountered whose quasi-identifier instance already exists in
the hash table, increment the count of its value.
Figure 3.3: An illustration of the binning uniqueness algorithm using sex, race and
date of birth as the quasi-identifier.
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ing, which we assumed might reasonably be known by an adversary wishing to learn
more about the details of their target’s stop:
1. The precinct of the stop.
2. The borough of the stop.
3. The sex of the individual stopped.
4. The race of the individual stopped.
5. The date of birth of the individual stopped.
6. The age of the individual stopped.
7. The height of the individual stopped.
8. The weight of the individual stopped.
9. The hair color of the individual stopped.
10. The eye color of the individual stopped.
11. The build of the individual stopped.
12. Whether an arrest was made.
13. Whether a summons was issued.
The first two attributes are specific to the stop, yet might be inferred by an
adversary who knows the general whereabouts of their target. The last two attributes
are also specific to the stop, yet would result in a public record of an arrest or a
summons under the targeted individual’s name. All of these attributes are numbers
that can take on a limited range of values, so no one will be trivially uniquified as they
would be by a string value that could vary due to typos. This paper does not include
other attributes specific to the stop itself, because we assume that the adversary
does not know these specifics and is attempting to learn more about the stop. An
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adversary who witnessed a stop, however, would likely be able to locate the record in
the dataset using the time, date, and location of the stop.
The uniquification algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3. It takes as input the
data as well as a list of all possible combinations of the n attributes under con-
sideration, where n ranges from 1 to 3. For example, if we were only considering
sex, race, and date of birth (“dob”), the attributeCombinationList when n = 2
would consist of [[sex, race], [sex, dob], [race, dob]]. Meaning, with the above 13 at-






. It returns the number of individuals in
the dataset for whom some attribute combination in attributeCombinationList is
uniquely identifying. This algorithm differs from [23], however, as unique attributes
which by themselves uniquify an individual are counted toward the unique-by-2-
attributes uniquification percentage. The unique-by-3-attributes uniquification per-
centage likewise includes those attributes that, by themselves or as a pair, would
uniquify an individual.
3.5.1 Uniquification Example
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 illustrate the uniquification algorithm on a small, simplified
version of the dataset that contains only sex, race and date of birth fields. It assumes
the number of quasi-identifier options under consideration is two.
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Algorithm 3 Uniquification Algorithm
1: procedure Uniquify(data, attributeCombinationList)
2: numUnique← 0
3: for all target in data do
4: for all attributeCombination in attributeCombinationList do
5: match← 0
6: for all other in data do
7: allAttributesMatch← True
8: for all attribute in attributeCombination do





14: if allAttributesMatch then
15: match← match + 1
16: end if
17: end for
18: if match == 2 then . If there are 2 matches for this
attribute combination, it is not a unique combination so break to save time and




22: if match == 1 then . If there’s only
1 match for this attribute combination, increment the number unique and break.
It is not necessary to look at any more attribute combinations, since the goal is
to see if any combination can uniquely identify a person.








(a) Select the first record in the dataset and the first combination of 2 quasi-
identifier options (here sex, race). Compare the selected record against every
other record in terms of the 2 chosen quasi-identifier options. This record
matches itself, so the count of matches is incremented.
(b) Continue in the same way for every other record in the dataset. As soon
as a second match is encountered, the quasi-identifier combination (here sex,
race) is not unique, so the next combination can be considered without com-
paring the selected record against the rest of the records for the chosen (sex,
race) combination.
(c) Begin again, comparing the first record against every other record in the
dataset for the next quasi-identifier combination (here sex, date of birth).
This record matches itself.
Figure 3.4: An illustration of the uniquification uniqueness algorithm using all com-
binations of two quasi-identifiers. 40
(a) Continue comparing the selected record (M, Black, 2/4/1990) against all others
in the dataset for the selected quasi-identifier combination.
(b) The end of the dataset has been reached and the selected record (M, Black,
2/4/1990) only matched itself in terms of sex and date of birth. Record that this
record was “uniquified” by a combination of two quasi-identifiers.
(c) Begin again, comparing the second record against every other record in the
dataset for the first quasi-identifier combination (here sex and race).




Our methods find that the stop-and-frisk data is highly uniquely identifying. That is,
for all examined quasi-identifiers, only a small number (relative to the total number
of stops) share all the attributes of the quasi-identifier. The results for the sampled
uniqueness algorithm 1 are presented in Figure 4.1 through 4.6, and in Appendix
A in Figure A.1 through Figure A.14. The results for the binning algorithm are
presented in Figure 4.7 through Figure 4.11 and Figure A.15 through Figure A.17 in
Appendix A.
4.1 Sampling Results: Stops With and Without
Photo ID
Figure 4.1a shows that, for all people in 2012 using the NYCLU data, the average
number of matches for each of the 1,000 randomly selected stops ranged from 1.1 to
10.5, depending on the quasi-identifier. The maximum variance was 98.47 for sex,
race, date of birth and weight plus or minus 30 pounds. As expected, the most specific
quasi-identifiers had the lowest number of average matches (sex, race, date of birth,
exact height, exact weight, both with and without the inclusion of eye color, resulted
in 1.1 average matches). Likewise, the highest number of matches corresponded to
the most genera, sex, race, date of birth quasi-identifier. The percent of stops that
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were unique with this data is presented in Figure 4.1b. Also as expected, the more
specific quasi-identifiers resulted in a greater number of unique stops: for example,
using sex, race, date of birth, exact height, and weight as a quasi-identifier, 90.8% of
the sampled stops had no match other than themselves. Using sex, race, and date of
birth, only 10.3% of stops were unique.
These trends hold throughout the all groups of data that were examined: more
specific quasi-identifiers lead to a lower number of average matches, with sex, race,
date of birth, exact height, exact weight, and (optionally) eye color standing out as
a particularly identifying combination. Additionally, Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier
(precinct, sex, race, date of birth, and exact height [6]) uniquely identifies a large
number of stops in the data and results in a low average number of matches, as seen
in column 2 of all the graphs.
Figure 4.2 presents the results from sampling the NYPD’s 2003-2012 data for
all people. Across the board, the average number of matches is higher than in the
NYCLU’s 2012-only data, sometimes considerably so as seen in Figure 4.2a. This
average number ranges from 1.8 for all three highly specific quasi-identifiers to 84.2
for sex, race, and date of birth. Likewise, the percent of stops that were unique is lower
considerably lower, ranging from a high of 69.7% for Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier to
a low of 2.0% for sex, race and date of birth, as seen in Figure 4.2b. Figure 4.2a
also shows that there was a large variance in the average number of matches: the
maximum variance recorded was 54,995.70 for sex, race, date of birth, exact height,
eye color and weight plus or minus 40 pounds. The maximum number of matches for
that quasi-identifier combination was 3,332.
There are a number of factors that might be responsible for the discrepancy be-
tween the NYCLU and NYPD numbers. First of all, since the NYPD data spans ten
years instead of one, there is a larger window of time for an individual to be stopped.
For example, if an individual whose attributes are distinct from everyone else in the
dataset were stopped once per year, they would be unique in the NYCLU data but
not in the NYPD data. Additionally, there are 4,792,543 total stops in the 2003-2012
NYPD data but only 532,912 stops in the NYCLU’s 2012 data. More stops means
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.1: Sampled uniqueness results for all people in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.2: Sampled uniqueness results for all people in the 2003-2012 NYPD dataset.
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that there is more of a chance for multiple individuals who share the same quasi-
identifier attributes to be stopped. Finally, the NYCLU data was sanitized in a way
that captured a good deal of information, including information that wasn’t present
in the NYPD data (for example, assigning a binary sex to stops marked “unknown” in
the NYPD dataset). This information may be more accurate, and thus more uniquely
identifiable, than incorrect or filler data from the NYPD dataset.
4.2 Sampling Results: Only Stops with Photo ID
This paper also examines only those stops where photo identification was presented in
order to examine whether the standard information presented on the photo identifica-
tion increases the uniqueness of the data. Accurate coding of individuals’ attributes
in the data is essential for re-identification, since this is what an attacker would use to
locate their target in the data. We hoped that by considering only those presenting
photo identification, the attributes recorded would more accurately reflect the ground
truth and would be more consistent over time. Indeed, as seen in Figure 4.3, stops
involving photo identification do have a lower average number of matches than in the
data as a whole: the sex, race, date of birth quasi-identifier, for instance, results in
an average of 5.6 matches as opposed to the previous 10.5 in Figure 4.3a. Likewise,
17.2% of the sampled sex, race, date of birth quasi-identifier attributes are unique,
as opposed to 10.3% for all the NYCLU data in Figure 4.3b.
The sampled uniqueness results for the NYPD’s 2003-2012 data are presented in
Figure 4.4b. As with the NYCLU data, photo identification increases the uniqueness
of the data and decreases the average number of matches. The average number
of matches for Harvard’s quasi-identifier, for example, is 2.3 for stops with photo
identification and 3.5 for all stops. Likewise, for the Harvard quasi-identifier, the
percent unique increases from 44.8% to 55.4%.
Finally, this paper examines the uniqueness of sub-groups in the NYCLU data,
including all the racial categories (African American, Asian, Black Hispanic, Native
American/Pacific Islander, White and White Hispanic), women only, and stops with
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.3: Sampled uniqueness results for all people with photo identification in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.4: Sampled uniqueness results for all people with photo identification in the
2003-2012 NYPD dataset.
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people aged twenty-five and older. Overall, we found that the more prevalent a
group was in the data, the less unique and the higher the average number of matches
they had for all categories. For example, we can contrast the uniqueness results of
African Americans, who make up 53.3% of all 2012 NYCLU stops and are the most
frequently stopped race in the data, against women, who make up only 7.1% of all
2012 NYCLU stops (as reported in section 1.2.1). For 2012 NYCLU stops involving
photo identification, the photo ID quasi-identifier (sex, race, date of birth, height
and eye color) results in 1.7 average matches for African Americans (Figure 4.5a) but
only 1.0 average matches for women (Figure 4.6a). Similarly, the percent of African
American stops that are unique using the photo ID quasi-identifier is 62.4% (Figure
4.5b), whereas it is 96.5% for women (Figure 4.6b).
Section A.1 presents additional results from the sampled uniqueness study, which
bear out the trends described above. These graphs present the results for all races
individually, as well as for women only and only people twenty-five years of age or
older in the 2012 NYCLU data.
4.2.1 Discussion: Sub-Populations and Photo Identification
As expected, sub-populations such as women, Native Americans and Pacific Islanders,
and Asians, who make up only a tiny number of the total stops in the NYCLU data
are more unique than those groups that are over-represented in the data, such as
African Americans (Table 4.1). This makes sense, since there are fewer individuals in
the data for them to match. It is also possible that individuals from groups that do
not fit a traditional profile, such as women, may be less likely to be seen as suspicious
and thus would not be stopped repeatedly. Overall, this means that groups that are
disproportionately targeted by police violence may be the least likely to be harmed
by the release of police data.
The increased uniqueness of stops with photo identification might be the result
of several different factors. First, individuals may be stopped repeatedly and only
present identification during some of those stops. This would lead to a lower number
of average matches and a higher chance of a unique stop due to the fact that their
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.5: Sampled uniqueness results for African Americans with photo identifica-
tion in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure 4.6: Sampled uniqueness results for women with photo identification in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
51
non-photo identification stops aren’t included in the photo ID studies. Additionally,
individuals who presented photo identification when stopped tended to be older (and
thus more unique, as will be discussed below): on average photo ID holders were 30
years old, as opposed to 28 years old for all people, as seen in Table 4.3. Moreover,
Blacks and Black Hispanics made up a slightly smaller percentage of the photo iden-
tification data than they did in the overall data, as seen in Table 4.1. On the other
hand, women (who make up a minority of the data and whose stops are thus more










With Photo 51.60% 6.54% 25.49% 11.77% 4.08% .53%
All 54.80% 6.87% 24.90% 9.71% 3.29% .43%
Table 4.1: Racial makeup of all people vs. only those with photo ID in the 2012
NYCLU data.
Gender Female Male
With Photo 6.97% 93.03%
All 7.22% 92.78%





Table 4.3: Average age of all people vs. only those with photo ID in the 2012 NYCLU
data.
Nevertheless, while it is not possible to be certain, it seems plausible that some
of the increased rate of uniqueness comes from the fact that the photo ID-only data
more accurately reflects the ground truth of those stopped and involves less guessed
information. Whereas the two most common birthdays in the data as a whole were





All Stops Photo ID Only
1st 1/01/1992: 156 10/30/1992: 53
2nd 1/01/1990: 153 3/04/1991: 50
3rd 9/16/1995: 149 8/12/1994: 49
4th 8/01/1994: 127 8/30/1993: 49
5th 11/02/1991: 126 1/01/1990: 48
6th 3/06/1993: 124 9/18:1990: 48
Table 4.4: Most common birthdays of all people vs. only those with photo ID in the
2012 NYCLU data and the number of people sharing those birthdays.
the data involving those with photo ID are seemingly random dates (10/30/1992,
3/04/1991, 8/12/1994, and 8/30/1993). The fifth most common birthday in the photo
ID set, however, is 1/01/1990. Additionally, in the data from all people there is a
larger gap in the number of people stopped with the most common birthdays, whereas
this gap disappears in the photo ID set (Table 4.4). This birthday diversity suggests
that police officers might be using the photo identification to record information for
the stop, meaning this information might be less likely to vary over time due to
misreporting by the individual stopped or differences in the police officer’s judgment.
Similarly, it seems possible that police may guess the value of other attributes in
systematically biased ways: for instance, they may be more likely to record that
someone is 6 foot as opposed to 6 foot 1 inches or 5 foot 11 inches. Due to this, it
is possible that the stops where photo ID was provided might be more accurate and
might provide a better basis for identifying a persistent individual in the data, and
thus might provide a better ground truth for re-identification.
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4.3 Binning Results
Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 present the binning results using the Luis Daniel, Harvard,
and photo identification quasi-identifiers, respectively. These graphs exhibit the same
trends as noted in the above section 4.1, and serve to present the information in a
more concise way. From these graphs, we see that, using Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier,
every group has close to only one average match (Figure 4.7a) and every group is over
90% unique (Figure 4.7b). The Harvard quasi-identifier resulted in slightly fewer
unique matches, with a minimum of 83.7% unique for African Americans with and
without photo identification (Figure 4.8b). Finally, the photo identification quasi-
identifier results in the lowest uniqueness, and only 68.6% of all African American
stops are unique (Figure 4.9b). Binning results from other quasi-identifiers are found
in Appendix A.2.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure 4.7: Binning uniqueness results for Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier (precinct, sex,
race, date of birth and height) in the NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per build
Figure 4.8: Binning uniqueness results for Harvard’s quasi-identifier (sex, race, date
of birth, height, eye color, hair color and build) in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure 4.9: Binning uniqueness results for sex, race, date of birth, height and eye
color in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
57
4.4 Uniquification Results
The uniquification results are presented in Table 4.5. While any one attribute rarely
uniquifies any record in the data, any two attributes “uniquify” nearly half of the
data (42.75%) and with any three attributes, more than half (64.31%) of entries are
uniquified. Since this is a computationally expensive algorithm, we only examine up
to three attributes.




Table 4.5: Percent unique with different numbers of attribute combinations in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
4.5 Discussion
Overall, the data contains enough information to uniquely identify a majority of the
stops based on demographic characteristics alone. Of the quasi-identifiers examined,
more specific quasi-identifiers and more unique data lead to fewer average matches
observed, which is to be expected. We can approximate the specificity of the quasi-
identifier by considering how many possible values it can take on: there are 123
different police precincts, 6 different races, 2 different sexes, 11 different hair colors,
8 different eye colors, and 4 different builds. The Harvard study assumes birthdays
can fall in a 30 year span and that height can take on 15 different values [30], and
it seems reasonable to assume that weight could take on 300/5 = 60 different values,
since it is most frequently coded in increments of 5 and we can say that most older
teenagers and adults (who tend to be stopped) probably weigh between 80 and 380
pounds. Using these approximations, Table 4.6 displays the number of possible values
that each quasi-identifier can take on. The sex, race, dob, height, eye, weight is by
far the most specific, followed by the Harvard study’s quasi-identifier [30], which is
followed by Luis Daniel’s quasi-identifier [6].
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure 4.10: Binning uniqueness results for sex, race, date of birth in the 2012 NYCLU
dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure 4.11: Binning uniqueness results for the 2003-2012 NYPD dataset.
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Quasi-identifier Number of possible values
sex, race, dob, height, eye, hair, build 693,792,000
precinct, sex, race, dob, height 242,433,000
sex, race, dob, height, eye, weight 946,080,000
sex, race, dob, height, eye 15,768,000
sex, race, dob, height, weight 118,260,000
sex, race, dob, height 1,971,000
sex, race, dob, weight 7,884,000
sex, race, dob 131,400
Table 4.6: Number of possible values for some of the examined quasi-identifiers.
The risk of an overly-specific quasi-identifier, however, is that it will fail to identify
all of an individual’s stops, which may have been coded differently from stop to stop.
In the case of Daniel’s quasi-identifier, an individual will not be connected to stops
occurring in different precincts. A broader quasi-identifier, such as sex, race, and date
of birth, however, may mistakenly attribute other people’s stops to one individual.
For a compromise that is potentially less prone to error (as noted above), we suggest
that sex, race, date of birth, eye color, and height be used to identify an individual,
since its specificity falls in the middle of the range. Also, all of these attributes (except
for race) can be found consistently coded on common forms of photo identification in
New York. When examining stops involving photo identification, this quasi-identifier
may perform the best. Nevertheless, we do not have a ground truth, so all we can
observe is the relative impact of the different quasi-identifiers on the percent unique





This chapter presents some possible methods for re-identifying, or attaching names,
to the entries in the stop-and-frisk dataset.
5.1 Nosy Neighbors and Employers
The first and most straightforward method of re-identification would be personal
knowledge of someone who has been stopped and frisked. A nosy neighbor or em-
ployer, for instance, might learn that an acquaintance was the subject of a stop-and-
frisk incident. Such a person, being familiar with their target, might know their sex,
race, date of birth, eye color, hair color, build and approximate height and weight.
The results from Chapter 4 show that this information would likely be enough to iden-
tify an individual in the data and get a handful of stops associated with them. This




Social media and the Internet can also be used to re-identify individuals in the data.
For instance, the New York Times wrote an article about Tyquan Brehon. Mr.
Brehon lives “in one of the most heavily policed neighborhoods in Brooklyn” and
was stopped more than 60 times before his 18th birthday [9]. The pictures in the
article suggest that he is African American, and we know from the article that he
is male. There is only one profile belonging to someone named Tyquan Brehon on
Facebook, and the publicly visible images match the man in the article. His birthday
is also publicly visible on Facebook. Using his visible characteristics, those mentioned
in the article, and the information gleaned from the Internet we can query for stops
matching Tyquan Brehon in the dataset.
The results of querying for Mr. Brehon’s characteristics are presented in Table 5.1.
It assumes his hair and eye color were both recorded as either black or brown and
only queries the data from 2003 to 2008 (before his 18th birthday, the period in
which the article tells us he was stopped multiple times). In addition, we search for
stops in Brooklyn for some of the quasi-identifiers, assuming that he was most likely
stopped in his “heavily policed” neighborhood (though he may have been stopped in
other cities). We note that city is not recorded in the 2003 dataset, so the considered
quasi-identifiers involving city will undercount the number of matches. Nevertheless,
it may be safe to assume that most of his stops would have occurred after 2003, since
Mr. Brehon was only 12 or 13 in that year and thus outside of the age range in which
people are usually stopped.
We do not know for sure that all of these stops belong to Mr. Brehon. However, if
at least some of the time his relevant information was coded correctly, we can assume
that some of his stops are captured in the matching stops. This significantly narrows
the field of stops that could belong to Mr. Brehon. Perhaps more importantly, though,
even if none of these stops are Mr. Brehon, an adversary may falsely believe that they
do belong to him and discriminate against him accordingly. An incorrect assumption
based on this data may still lead to negative effects for those in the dataset.
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Quasi-identifier # of matches
DOB, race, sex, hair, eye, city 29
DOB, race, sex, city 32
DOB, race, sex, hair, eye 70
DOB, race, sex 76
Table 5.1: Number of matches for quasi-identifier instances that match Tyquan Bre-
hon’s characteristics during the time period (2003-2008) in which we know he was
stopped.
5.3 Criminal Records
Another method of re-identifying individuals in the data would be to search for crim-
inal records or mugshots, as suggested in the Harvard study [30]. This has some
limitations, however. We know that 88.9% of the stops in the data do not result
in a summons or arrest. Additionally, arrest records and other police information
are not made public in the state of New York. What would be public, however, are
the court records associated records. “Court records are subject to disclosure under
Section 255 of the Judiciary Law” according to O’Connor, who used them to map
all the summonses in New York City [20]. While this would re-identify those stops
resulting in court proceedings, it seems that there would be more information in court
proceedings themselves than in the the stop-and-frisk dataset, and thus the dataset
might not significantly contribute to the harm faced by the individual. This paper
does not pursue this method of re-identification.
5.4 Voter Records
Finally, the Harvard study suggests using public voter information to re-identify in-
dividuals in this dataset [30]. They suggest using the sex, race, date of birth, height,
hair color, eye color, build quasi-identifier to identify the 100 most frequently stopped
individuals, and then to assume that the zip code where they were most frequently
stopped is their home zip code. The combination of sex, date of birth, and zip code
should be enough to uniquely identify 87% of individuals in the voting records [24].
There are a number of shortcomings to this, which the authors address. For instance,
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people may be stopped more often in locations that do not correspond to their home
location. Also, the young African American men that make up the bulk of the stops
are less likely to be registered voters, both because they are often too young to be
eligible and because low-income People of Color are less likely to vote [30].
By submitting a FOIL request, we were able to obtain the voter records for New
York State. We tested both the Harvard quasi-identifier as well as the photo ID
quasi-identifier, using the methods suggested by Harvard on the 2012 NYCLU data.
This involved only using entries with photo identification in order to increase the
likelihood that the information was correctly coded in the stop-and-frisk data.
A complication arose from the fact that the zip code field is never filled out in
the stop-and-frisk data. Instead, we used the State Plane Coordinate System of
1983 x- and y-coordinates from the data, which were automatically generated at each
stop. We converted them to latitude and longitude using Earth Point [3] and got the
corresponding zip codes using Pygeocoder [31]. Occasionally, one of the top 100 most
frequently stopped individuals had more than one most common stop zip code. In
that case, we searched for all of the most common stop zip codes associated with the
quasi-identifier instance.
Of the top 100 most frequently stopped individuals in the 2012 NYCLU data who
had photo identification, using the Harvard quasi-identifier, 28 had only one match
for their date of birth, sex, and zip code in the voter records. 75 had one or more
matches in the voter records, with the average number of matches being 3.01 (Table
5.2). This shows that voter records may be a reasonable way to re-identify individuals
in this data, though it is possible that this process incorrectly links people, since it can
only correctly identify individuals who have registered to vote who were also stopped
in their home zip code. Likewise, since we used the specific Harvard quasi-identifier,
it is more likely that all the stops selected as belonging to one of the top 100 most
frequently stopped individuals do indeed correspond to the same person. However,
this method may miss some of an individual’s stops, if, for example, their build was
coded different across the dataset.
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Percent with 1 [sex,dob,zip] Match in the Voter Records 28%
Percent with any number of [sex,dob,zip] Matches in Voter Records 75%
Average Number of [sex,dob,zip] Matches 3.01
Maximum Number of [sex,dob,zip] Matches 13
Table 5.2: Results of the re-identification experiment with the top 100 most frequently





This paper examined the risks associated with the release of New York City’s stop-
and-frisk data. While this data release was instrumental in ending the racially biased
program, the release itself may bring further harm upon the people stopped under
the program.
This paper found that each stop contains an average of 7.7 pieces of sensitive
information. Moreover, an adversary who knows only three well-chosen pieces of basic
demographic information can uniquely identify 64% of all stops. The vast majority
of people can be uniquely identified in the 2012 NYCLU data by an adversary who
knows enough information about their target: for instance, knowing a target’s sex,
race, date of birth, eye color and exact height and weight makes 89.9% of the 2012
NYCLU stops unique and leads to just 1.1 average matches. In the NYPD data from
2003 to 2012, this combination of attributes makes 67.5% of the stops unique and
leads to 1.8 average matches.
Moreover, this paper demonstrated that there are real ways for an adversary to
re-identify this unique data: the most straightforward example of such an attack is
a nosy neighbor who, by virtue of being acquainted with their target, would know
basic information about the target. Since the data contains sensitive information that
might not otherwise be known, such as the reason a police officer believed someone
was suspicious, there is a risk of harm associated with its release.
Due to these risks, care must be taken when releasing data containing sensi-
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tive information about individuals, particularly information about individuals from
marginalized groups who might suffer the effects of discrimination more keenly than
people of a higher socio-economic status. The NYPD’s 2013 data mitigates some of
the threat by not including the date of birth field. Without this field, the studies in
this paper would be much less successful in uniquely identifying individuals. Never-
theless, removing the date of birth field is not sufficient: the data contain additional
information that could be used by a nosy neighbor to identify their target, such as
the exact location where a stop was made (which might correspond to the target’s
home address), and the time and date of the stop (which could be observed). More
work must be done to assess the best way to this release data in a way that preserves
its utility for activists seeking to challenge racist police practices. Techniques such
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The following sections contain additional graphs from the sampled (A.1) and binning
(A.2) uniqueness studies. They provide additional information about the uniqueness
of stops for each racial groups, women, and individuals who are at least twenty-five
years of age.
A.1 Sampled Uniqueness Additional Figures
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.1: Sampled uniqueness results for African Americans in the 2012 NYCLU
dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.2: Sampled uniqueness results for people aged 25 and older in the 2012
NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.3: Sampled uniqueness results for people aged 25 and older with photo
identification in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.4: Sampled uniqueness results for Asians in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.5: Sampled uniqueness results for Asians with photo identification in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.6: Sampled uniqueness results for Black Hispanics in the 2012 NYCLU
dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.7: Sampled uniqueness results for Black Hispanics with photo identification
in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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A.2 Binning Uniqueness Additional Figures
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.8: Sampled uniqueness results for Native Americans in the 2012 NYCLU
dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.9: Sampled uniqueness results for Native Americans with photo identifica-
tion in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.10: Sampled uniqueness results for White Hispanics in the 2012 NYCLU
dataset.
83
(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.11: Sampled uniqueness results for White Hispanics with photo identifica-
tion in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.12: Sampled uniqueness results for whites in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.13: Sampled uniqueness results for whites with photo identification in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches
(b) Percent unique
Figure A.14: Sampled uniqueness results for women in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure A.15: Binning uniqueness results for sex, race, date of birth, height and weight
in the 2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure A.16: Binning uniqueness results for sex, race, date of birth and height in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
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(a) Average number of matches per bin
(b) Percent unique per bin
Figure A.17: Binning uniqueness results for sex, race, date of birth and weight in the
2012 NYCLU dataset.
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